Copyright 2006 by Tad Beckman, Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, CA 91711
The very first amendment added to the Constitution of the United States reads, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The first part of this amendment has come to be known as the doctrine of "the separation of church and state." Some argue that this amendment divides society into secular interests and interests of religious faith, assuring that our political society is purely secular; others argue that the amendment merely secures the free practice of religious faith, never intending to prohibit religious practices or beliefs in the political sphere. This difference in interpretation of the Constitution lurks behind virtually all of the issues where church and state seem to come into conflict.
We should acknowledge that the issue here is peculiarly American and has a great deal to do with the origins of the American founders and their experiences with religious persecution under state power. It would be incorrect to assume that democracy requires the First Amendment since many of the democratic states of Western Europe actually have established churches. [See Stepan, Alfred. "Religion, Democracy, and the 'Twin Tolerations'" in Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos. World Religions and Democracy.] We are left, then, wondering whether the First Amendment is simply intended to protect free religious practices from state authority, which it clearly does, or whether it also is intended to protect the state, hence minority groups in the state, from religious power.
The concept of separation of church and state generates many disputes and most of these wind up in the courts, for good reason. As an example, we might consider whether state or Federal money should be used to support church school programs. After all, governments do support education in broad ways and church schools are primarily aimed at educating America's youth. Nevertheless, secularists will argue that church schools also educate toward specifically religious contents and public support would, then, amount to "establishment of religion" for those students.
Another example of this issue is the question of whether governments --- state or Federal --- can require that Creationism (or "Intelligent Design") be taught in school science classes on an equal footing with Darwin's Theory of Evolution. Very few science teachers would agree that Creationism possesses scientific credibility. Why then should it be taught along with respected scientific theory? Isn't this purely a matter of a Christian majority, in certain states, exercising its will on a religious matter? On the other hand, church members in these communities may argue that Darwinian science runs dramatically contrary to their religious beliefs and the beliefs they wish their children to hold. Doesn't the state's willingness to allow Darwinian teaching in public schools amount to a violation of the freedom to exercise religious beliefs in the First Amendment?
In point of fact, there is a large area of public life where religious groups believe their rights to exercise religious practices are violated --- for example, instances where a state uses its obligation to protect every citizen to insist that certain medical procedures be performed on a child against the religious wishes of the parents. This argument opens up a very serious issue between religion and democracy, an issue that has dramatic relevance to the potential of democracy around the world. What happens when religious authority is not only un-democratic but is, in fact, hostile to the culture of individual freedom assumed in a democratic society? Can democracy ever exist, for example, in a society where women's rights are almost non-existent because of religious beliefs and where religious leaders exercise unchecked punitive control over women?
The religious beliefs of candidates for political office occasionally come into this debate. John F. Kennedy's candidacy attracted some significant protest from Protestants and secularists who argued that a Catholic president would be guided by the Pope. While the argument never went too far in its time, it did call into question the allegiances of religious politicians. If the people are promised "free exercise" of religious belief, how far can this practice be carried into their roles as agents of government? George W. Bush made his evangelical Christian beliefs an important part of his candidacy and attracted large numbers of similarly minded Americans to his campaign. Bush has used his executive authority (usually unreported and always unchecked) to exercise religious morality wherever possible --- in drug approval, in health programs, and in foreign aid. At the same time, during the last election, some officials in the Catholic Church allegedly told their congregations that anyone who voted for John Kerry should be forbidden to celebrate the Sacrament [which is actually worse than calling one's vote for Kerry a "sin"] because of his opposition to Church authority regarding a woman's choice for abortion.
How far can any candidate rightfully carry his/her religious beliefs into the execution of office? Is it lawful for a Supreme Court justice to make a decision based on his/her religious preferences? And, consequently, is it lawful for a president to nominate a justice knowing how his/her religious persuasions might influence future decisions? Or do these implicitly carry the government into the region of establishing particular religious practices? Presumably, possibilities like this loomed large in the minds of our nation's founders and the First Amendment was meant to protect the people from this kind of abuse. The faithful, on the other hand, might argue that churches are acting like any other faction. Labor unions, for example, commonly urge their members to vote one way or another. But is there a difference between the authority wielded by union leaders and the authority of a church? In the present discussion, one should look critically at the ways in which the Bush administration works with and through highly influential, national religious media --- also the diverse ways in which the Bush administration uses executive authority to support religious programs and to oppose abortion (even modest birth control) abroad.
Bill McKibben's article, "The Christian Paradox," in Harper's Magazine is included in the reading so as to better understand the sources of pressure currently energizing the debate over religious influence in politics. McKibben's arguments can be seen in greater detail in Gary Hart's book God and Caesar in America: An Essay on Religion and Politics and Jimmy Carter's book Our Endangered Values: America's Moral Crisis. All three authors agree on two points: first, the powerful alliance of religious forces in the US today has gone far beyond justifiable religious issues in seeking political influence and power; and second, that there is a dramatic dichotomy between US policies and behaviors, both at home and abroad, and genuine Christian teachings.
The democratic spirit reflected in our fundamental documents and in the Federalist Papers was devoted to the common good and included a sense of care that all Americans should prosper. The spirit of free-market capitalism, however, not only ignores this sense of care but actually opposes it, seeing itself, instead, as based on strength and competition. Success in the free market is viewed simplistically as a measure of personal commitment and talent. Our culture has little sympathy for those who find themselves at the bottom of the economic system. Ironically, the care included in our early democratic spirit was probably motivated by Christian attitudes; in two centuries, however, those attitudes seem to have been abandoned.
So we are confronted, today, by a strange situation. There is a powerful effort --- through national and local media as well as influence in the political process itself --- to assert the right of religious (indeed, Christian) beliefs and practices within the political arena. At the same time, the beliefs and practices advanced by this alliance are no longer authentically Christian and bear little cultural similarity to our democratic heritage.
To argue that the First Amendment requires a strict division between secular and religious worlds suggests that all religious issues are precluded from the political realm. Opponents argue that, in fact, the First Amendment requires accommodation of religious belief because of the "free exercise" clause; a purely secular state would be unjustifiably intolerant. The First Amendment requires a balanced relationship between church and state. These are issues discussed by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson in their book Why Deliberative Democracy? [Ch. 2, "Moral Conflict and Political Consensus"]. Gutmann and Thompson argue that we cannot fairly exclude all religious thought from government and must, therefore, develop ways of deciding when and how religious sentiments are admissable. One of the chief areas of concern is where the moral feelings of a group step into the political arena. The familiar slogan --- "You can't legislate morality!" --- has been loudly announced often enough but by quite diverse groups, occasionally on quite different sides of the church-state argument. In reality, though, Gutmann and Thompson argue that we are forced to iron out how legitimate moral conflicts can be worked out in political contexts.
Those who want an entirely secular government, unaffected by religious interests, argue that matters of religion (as matters of faith only) are undecidable, that government should therefore take a neutral position on these matters, and that neutrality demands inaction. Religious and moral issues are precluded from political consideration. Gutmann and Thompson argue on Lockean grounds that religious issues are not necessarily undecidable and that it is even conceivable that a "true religion" exists. The political issue is that governments should not be trusted to make such decisions for the people. Unlike the strong argument for preclusion, this leaves a range of religious issues that may be legitimately admissable to political consideration short of government deciding on the truth of any religion. How could this happen? The answer is that certain issues may offer a sufficient rational basis for deliberative discussion. Most commonly, these would be issues where there is substantial agreement across religious boundaries so that accommodation could occur without committing to the truth of any one. In this argument, the principles of accommodation become more important than the principles of preclusion.
Are there issues that can enter the political arena and others that obviously cannot? Gutmann and Thompson suggest that racial discrimination is an issue that cannot be admitted even though there are religions that sanction it. The argument rests on the conclusion that there are no rational arguments for racial discrimination that anyone can bring forward for deliberation. The so-called arguments all reduce to willingly following textual advice or authoritarian commands or rationalizations of personal preferences. Racial discrimination is not a legitimate moral issue, meaning that political society can freely legislate against racial discrimination (in order to protect minority rights) without acknowledging the arguments of certain religious groups.
On the other hand, many of the people who take strong and active positions on capital punishment are motivated by religious considerations. Does this mean that they should be ignored? The question should be decided on the basis of the moral legitimacy of the issue. And that legitimacy should be determined by the kinds of rational arguments that can be presented for and against capital punishment. If these are arguments that people of good will can listen to and consider reasonably from diverse points of view, then the issue can be admitted to the political sphere.
Abortion, similarly, is an issue for which there are rational arguments on all sides. On that ground, abortion is a moral issue that can be accommodated in the political arena. It cannot be excluded merely on the basis that some parties hold their positions because of religious beliefs.
If we take this position that certain moral issues must come into the political arena, we are left with some very hard work because we must now develop principles of accommodation for their consideration. This is where the present political scene seems to have fallen down completely. Americans are too fixed on "majority rule" as the principle for resolving disagreements. It is probable, in fact, that the majority of Americans are Christians and it may be that they accept religious arguments against abortion under any circumstances. Is it "democratic" to believe, on this basis, that grasping the majority votes on the Supreme Court or in the Senate necessarily warrants negative decisions on abortion rights. A common phrase used these days is that everything should just "get an up-or-down vote." That sentiment, however, obviously jumps right past the reasons for accommodating these issues --- the basis of rational deliberation --- and closes off debate. There is nothing to debate, the majority would argue, because they are not interested in hearing opposing reasons.
While Gutmann and Thompson believe that certain moral issues should be allowed to face political resolution, they place this resolution strictly within the mode of deliberation. This is what the first ten amendments (the Bill of Rights) are all about. The minority must be protected from the majority, meaning that the issues between them have to be settled on rational grounds that are deliberately discussed. This can be achieved, Gutmann and Thompson argue, only if the parties can come together with mutual respect. Accommodating moral issues means working with them carefully in reasoned discussions and not just weighing the votes one way or the other between opposing views that are never pushed to justification.
There is indeed a rich supply of expressions that authors deploy in the rhetorical assault on a political world from which they seem to feel alienated. Consider "secular humanists," "liberals," "Leftists," "feminists," "postmodernists," and now "secular neutralists/pluralists." According to Graham Walker, neutralists and pluralists are, inevitably, just as bad as the others because their malicious attitudes toward "revealed religion" are often transparent. It would seem that even attempts at allowing religious diversity, no matter how sincere, fail in Walker's eyes. His position, indeed, appears to argue against the very first clause of the First Amendment, the "establishment clause."
One can suppose that, in Walker's mind and those of similar mind, secular humanists and liberals are all just variations of Leftists who, of course, are really just Marxist Communists. Hence, it is automatic that people of this cast are destructively antagonistic toward religion ("Godless Communism" etc.). Unfortunately, such broad --- if not simply wild --- generalizations are not helpful; they certainly do not enhance an understanding of these people's positions.
Unfortunately, the problem has already begun within the word 'secular' itself. The word fails to have a positive meaning and seems to derive its somewhat negative meaning always by reference to a religious worldview. In other words, it starts from the presumption that a religious worldview is well known and then struggles to define a realm that abstracts away that religious content. Hence, the earliest form of use was all about members of the clergy who lived outside the monastic system in the profane world. Is it actually possible to define the word in a positive way and without explicitly acknowledging a contrast to religious views? Presumably, a well disciplined scientific worldview can do this; however, Walker wants to argue that even this approach is "worse than overt religious establishments because [it gets its force] . . . by [a completely transparent] denial and indirection." In effect, Walker's argument is that, so long as religious people live in the same community, it is impossible to pursue a secular society that is not, by definition, a negation of religion. That makes our attempts at pluralism and diversity a mirage. [The irony of all this is that the scientific, empirical worldview simply sees what it (literally) sees and nothing more so it represents a "denial" only because others assert unseen religious truths. But Walker, and others, refuse to accept the responsibility for this.]
Is this argument reasonable? I think not; but where is the problem? It begins, I think, in the very long tradition of religious authority and manifests itself in an unwillingness to consider a worldview other than the one authorized by one's own religious association. [One will not be surprised that Walker is a professor at The Catholic University of America, hence, I assume, more comfortable within an authoritarian religious community.] If this is the position one takes, then of course secular pluralism is a lost cause because you have made it a lost cause yourself. It is not an argument that reveals anything about the secularist; it simply reiterates your own refusal to enter into a "compromise world." From Walker's point of view, we have no right to suggest that a Catholic should live in anything but a Catholic world. It should not be surprising, then, that Walker's argument takes us in the direction of questioning the "establishment clause" in the First Amendment. At bottom, Walker wants to refuse the validity of even attempting a secular society.
Walker's little story about Easter in the public schools (pp. 113-4) is telling. To him, the truth is clearly Christ crucified and resurrected, no Easter bunnies and colored eggs here. There's no need, obviously, to question Walker about pagan festivals of spring, fertility rights, etc. For him, the true meaning of Easter is obviously possessed by the Catholic Christian Church; hence, anything else is a lie or, at the very least, a malicious attempt to deceive. It is in this context that Walker delivers his ultimate judgment on liberalism. "Liberalism . . . handles difference dishonestly and imperialistically." In other words, by giving equal time to all (pluralism), we are withholding the truth (of some religious authority). In Walker's world there actually can be no such thing as religious toleration because this would always mean giving in, in some sense, to agree that the world could actually be conceived in some different way than one's own religion says. In Walker's mind the partial establishment of religion is a far better option even if the government makes a mistake and establishes the wrong religious institutions. Why would this be? Clearly, his reason is that the fact of establishment at least promises, or acknowledges, authenticity to some religious belief and, hence, implicitly authenticates one's own religion even though making the mistake of establishing someone else's.
In the succeeding article, Amy Gutmann's arguments are far more sophisticated and useful. The establishment clause should be preserved without question precisely because the combination of political and religious authority/power would be intolerable, as can be easily verified in a multitude of societies around the world. At the same time, Gutmann wants to make it clear that religious beliefs can be legitimate motivators for proposals carried into the public political sphere. These are not barred by the establishment clause so long as they do not implicitly establish a religion. The position rests on Gutmann's contention that proposals motivated by religious beliefs can still be justified or supported by reasons available to other members of the public sphere. In other words, proposals that merely reiterate a religious doctrine will quickly drop out of debate; but those that can draw a wider basis of support will remain. In this respect, taking 'secular' as meaning non-religious, Gutmann denies that "secular" and "public" are the same. Secular views and religious views both enter the public sphere. Government's exclusion of establishing religion does not imply that it is trying to create a secular public sphere. Secularists and religionists are free to fight out their spiritual differences on equal playing fields in the public sphere so long as they can accommodate each others reasons.
Is 'liberalism' really a dirty word? One hopes it is not since it's meaning refers to "liberation" and "making men free." Why, then, does it come out full of dirt in the mouths of so many political factions, today? The answer is rather obvious in the context of religious factions. While we occasionally speak of "revealed religion," revelations are relatively uncommon and the majority of religious practitioners secure their beliefs through strong church authority. Liberation and intellectual freedom have traditionally threatened church authorities. The Catholic Church, for example, insists that married couples should not exercise means of birth control; yet many Catholics do exercise their personal freedom (not recognized by the Church) by using some means of control. Liberation from the absolute authority of the Church is viewed as an extreme danger in all circumstances. It is such a great danger, viewed from the center of authority, that liberal practices within society at large, even when they are clearly practiced by people of other faiths or of no faith at all, are threatening. The implicit formula is that no one can be free to live as they please when control of life is so important to those invested in a particular faith. Presumably, the belief is that non-conformist living by the un-believers will negatively influence church authority over believers. Obviously, when this formula is taken to its ultimate conclusion, there is no hope for a secular society or liberal democracy. Certainly, religious groups have a right to enforce conformity within their own community of followers; but how far can conformity be extended outside of that following before it becomes a tyranny of the majority?
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