Copyright 2006 by Tad Beckman, Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, CA 91711
Plato's Life in Brief Almost all of what we know about Plato comes from his own account of his life in one of thirteen letters (#7) that were preserved along with his dialogues. In addition, Diogenes Laertius, in the second or third century A.D., recorded various facts of Plato's life that he had gleaned from contemporary sources which have not been otherwise preserved.
Plato was born in 427 B.C. in Athens to an aristocratic family. His father, Ariston, traced his family back through several of the ancient kings of Athens to the god Poseidon. His mother, Perictione, was descended from Dropides, who was a relative and close friend of Solon. Her brother was Charmides and her cousin was Critias, both of whom were well known politicians of the day. Plato had two older brothers, Adeimantus and Glaucon, and a sister, Potone. Plato's father died while Plato was a boy and Perictione married her uncle, by whom she had a boy, Antiphon, whom Plato mentions in one of his dialogues.
Plato's youth came at a terrible time in Athenian history; and he might well have been a very different person had he been born at another time, perhaps several decades earlier. In the early period of the Peloponnesian Wars, a democratic and powerful Athens had been lead onward by one of its greatest political leaders, Pericles; but by Plato's birth, Pericles had died and Athens had begun to decline. The disastrous expedition to Syracuse occurred when Plato was fifteen, and the final surrender of Athens occured when he was twenty three. Sparta terminated Athenian democracy and established a ruling oligarchy, "the Thirty Tyrants," in 404. Charmides and Critias were part of this government and encouraged Plato to enter politics.
Plato had become a disciple of Socrates when he was eighteen but members of his family had known Socrates for a long time. Plato was twenty seven or twenty eight when Socrates was brought to trial and executed (399 B.C.). While the oligarchy had lasted only one year and democracy had been restored, Athenian politics had become completely destabilized and wise leadership was sadly lacking. While he had been tempted by politics and while it was the natural direction for one of his lineage, Plato was discouraged by everything that he witnessed.
Around 390 B.C., Plato began to travel and wound up in Syracuse where he began his philosophical teaching by introducing Dion (brother-in-law of the king, Dionysus I) to his ethical and political theories. While it is not clear how long this relationship lasted or exactly why it ended, it is clear that Plato's first experiment was a disaster; Plato was sold as a slave by king Dionysus I! Plato was purchased back and returned to Athens, but Syracuse continued to figure into his life. In 367 he returned to Syracuse at Dion's invitation but had to leave hastily when Dion was accused of high treason. Again, in 361 he returned at the invitation of Dionysus II only to become involved in such violent disagreements that he left the state only with difficulty.
Shortly after his first return to Athens (387 B.C.), Plato founded his school, the Academy, as a residence place of scholars and students, just outside of Athens. The time can be associated with the dialogue "Meno," and it is the beginning of the Platonic, as opposed to the earlier Socratic, dialogues. Plato continued as the director of the Academy throughout his life and it became a recognized institution that attracted men with their own independent reputations.
Plato's philosophical personality was quite different from that of Socrates. Socrates' style was "conversational" and it remained thoroughly Athenian and thoroughly focused on politics and the virtues. Plato's travels and his exposure to scholars who came from diverse schools of thought and teachings made him far more cosmopolitan. Beyond Socrates, Plato was thoroughly exposed to the teachings of Pythagoras, Parmenides, and Heraclitus, at least. Plato developed theories about the nature of the world, the constitution and origins of knowledge, and immortal (reincarnated) life. In the Platonic dialogues, Socrates remains an ever-present character but the philosophical subjects become diverse and the style reaches toward lecturing and occasionally abandons dialectic entirely. The later dialogues take up subjects of natural science. Ironically, since this was the side of Plato's writing that most appealed to the Arab scholar/scientists, this was the Plato that passed through centuries of Arab translation and commentary and, from there, into 13th Century Europe along with Aristotle. It was not until the 16th Century that Europeans uncovered the true diversity of Plato's thinking.
Plato's book-length dialogue "The Republic" is his chief work and, certainly, one of the most influential works in political philosophy ever written. The book is about 300 pages in Greek (about 400 in English translation). Along with "Meno," "Phaedo," and "Symposium," it is the product of his middle years, a period when Plato's Academy was still new, Athens was still struggling to find its political footing, and Plato was still somewhat involved in the affairs of Syracuse.
In the earliest editions, "The Republic" was divided into ten books and those divisions have largely remained in tact. However, as will be seen below, there are better organizations and some editions, today, ignore the original books. To compare across editions, the Greek pagination has become the only reliable basis. A significantly more serious problem centers around the Greek word, 'dikaiosune,' which has at least two rather different translations. Older translations almost always replaced this word with 'justice' so most readers have grown up thinking about "The Republic" as Plato's treatise on justice. Some new translations, however, replace this word with 'morality.' This creates a number of confusions. For modern audiences, morality seems equivalent to virtue; but for the Greeks justice is but one of the four virtues. At the same time, modern readers may feel uncomfortable talking about individuals being just, thinking that justice is only a matter for states. While I have convinced myself that both translations have their advantages, I will use "justice" throughout this discussion since that is consistent with most of the editions that are available.
Having said these introductory things about editions, we can say outright that "The Republic" is a book about justice or, in some sense, about morality. But how does a book about justice/morality come to be read as a treatise on political philosophy? The answer lies at the core of Plato's thinking about political society (the 'polis' in Greek). The polis is an organic whole in which the individual citizens play various roles according to their specialties; but equally, each individual is an analogous organic whole made up parts of his soul, these parts playing roles in determining that individual. Finally, both individual and state come to be virtuous in the same way; that is, their constitutive parts play their roles in specifically harmonious ways. Thinking of individuals, the Greeks recognized four aspects of virtue --- courage, temperance, wisdom, and justice. In Plato's conception of the state, the virtuous state should also demonstrate these virtues. Since justice is by far the most abstract of these features, "The Republic" concentrates its main attention on this; however, along the way, Plato also develops his complete theory of wisdom.
While early translators and editors of the work divided it into ten books, it breaks most naturally into five distinct parts. Book I through the first third of Book II (367D), is an introductory Socratic dialogue of traditional form. Socrates is at the house of a rich and wise old man, Cephalus, in the company of Cephalus' son, Polemarchus, and Plato's brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus. A well known Sophist, Thrasymachus, is also present. The topic of conversation turns to justice and Socrates questions Polemarchus, producing the usual results. While Polemarchus has been brought up well in the house of Cephalus and possesses the traditional wisdom of the poets, he does not really know how to interpret this into a contemporary framework or apply it to individual behavior. Thrasymachus is eventually drawn into the questioning and he proposes a cynical definition --- "Justice is nothing but the advantage of the stronger." Under Socrates' questioning, Thrasymachus is led to defend three assertions --- that selfishness is the ultimate principle of living well, that selfishness will make one strong, and that selfishness will make one happy. Socrates attempts to demonstrate that selfishness represents lack of wisdom, hence, is not a principle of virtue at all. Thus, the selfish life cannot be a just or happy life. Since it remains obvious to all listeners that the general belief is that selfish and manipulative people wind up famous, rich, and happy, Glaucon and Adeimantus wind up suggesting that Socrates must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a life of justice is good for its own sake even if otherwise unrewarded by wealth or reputation.
From here through Book IV (445E), Plato describes the ideal state and its virtues. He begins with an anthropological vision of how people may have come together originally to find protection and to seek survival. As the state becomes larger and more complex, the need for order and defense becomes greater, and Plato asserts that this is provided by the "spirited" and "philosophic" natures of its leaders, the Guardians. The bulk of this section of the book is devoted to an extensive critique of education. Plato makes it clear that the human soul is always vulnerable when embodied. (Plato believes in the reincarnation of immortal souls.) To become well educated, the person must avoid being corrupted and must be exposed to a gradual and well tuned program of learning in gymnastic, music, poetry, arithmetic, and geometry. (Plato would have had real problems with Acid Rock, Rap, TV, and cinematic violence!) Plato's state is divided into classes and its founding myth (the Myth of Metals) suggests that everyone is born with a specific metal essence which the Guardians can detect within the educational process; hence, regardless of the status of one's parents, citizens will be divided into their essential natures (iron, bronze, silver, and gold) and deployed in society appropriately (farming, crafts, military service, and ruling). At the end of this section, then, Plato suggests his answer to Glaucon and Adeimantus. Both the state and the individual are "organic" entities; indeed, they are exactly analogous "organisms," each consisting of three parts --- the ruling part, the spirited part, and the desiring part. These are easiest to see in the macrocosm of the state, where we see that the ruling part is the class of Guardians, the spirited part is the class of warrior Auxiliaries, and the desiring part is the class of citizens at large (farmers, fishermen, craftsmen, and artisans). With more difficulty, Plato suggests the tripartite division of the soul (a suggestive model that survives directly into Freudian analysis), the regulative mind, the fighting spirit, and the appetitive organs (what Freud mirrored in his superego, ego, and id). The section concludes with Plato defending the idea that his state is necessarily virtuous and that the analogous individual is also virtuous. For the state is wise, being ruled by well educated Guardians, courageous, being defended by educated and spirited Auxiliaries, and temperate, being well order and, hence, able to work harmoniously toward a common good. The state is just, in Plato's mind, exactly because each individual does that specific work to which he/she is best suited and submits to both the ordering principles and one's natural talents. Injustice is when an individual tries to become what he/she is not qualified for and steps outside of the internal ordering of the state. The virtues are applied analogously to the microcosm of individual life.
The third section consists of Books V (449A) through VII (541B). Having described both the ideal state and the ideal person, and having suggested what constitutes justice in each, Plato recognizes that he must demonstrate how it is possible to reach such ideals. His answer, the rule of wisdom, suggests that the best life is that of philosophy and the best ruler is the philosopher king.
The work concludes with two further sections. In Book VIII (543) through IX (592B), Plato offers an extensive discussion of how the state will decline into corruption if it abandons the rule of wisdom. First it slides into the stage of Timocracy (the rule of honor), then into the stage of Oligarchy (the rule of wealth), then the stage of Democracy (the rule of the whole), and finally the stage of Tyranny (the rule of a despot). (The pathology of Fascist tyrannies rising out of democratic republics, in the first half of this century, was well anticipated by Plato.) Plato includes the analogical decline of the individual. In Book X (595), Plato concludes with a discussion of the complex interrelationships between the arts and statecraft; he follows this (614B) with a myth, tying the whole discussion into a classic story of the struggle of the soul to lead a good life.
In this discussion, we will begin Book II at the end of the introductory conversation with Thrasymachus and others, at the house of Cephalus. From here (367D) forward, the style takes a radical change of direction away from the dialogue style of Plato's early Socratic works and toward a monologue lecture style. While the earlier conversation represents Socrates biographically, at his best, the lectures are purely Platonic and Socrates simply functions as Plato's mouthpiece. The next natural division is at the end of Book IV (445E).
Socrates has been challenged to define justice and to demonstrate that the just person is happy. At the beginning of this section, Socrates suggests Plato's analogy between the individual and the state. They are both organic wholes and Plato believes that they both express the classic virtues. The suggestion is that we should defer consideration of individuals and talk, instead, about states. The state, being larger, will show us the virtues in the large; hence, it will be easier to see justice in the example of the state. At the end of this section, Plato returns to the analogy and, having discovered what justice is in the state, he carries the analogy back to the individual to complete the task by defining justice in the individual.
The majority of the discussion occurs between these two parts and is a thorough consideration of how states come into being, what their needs are, how they should be organized and directed by a reliable guardian class, how the guardians should be educated, and how the guardians should live. By the end of this discussion, Plato has divided out a special mature class of guardians as the true guardian rulers and left the bulk as auxiliaries who continue to hold responsibility for maintaining order and defending the state. It is a three-class state (guardian rulers, guardian auxiliaries, and craft-workers) and Plato justifies the separation of classes with his Myth of the Metals, recognizing that every state requires a "noble lie" as its foundation. It is important to recognize that the "metals" represent "inner strengths" or attributes of the people and not merely accidental features that they have acquired. The state is expected to mirror the natures of the individual people who live in it, with people playing the roles appropriate to their natures.
Plato's view of how states come into being represents interesting anthropological speculation. It tends to focus attention on people's activities and talents and, as a consequence, it tends to ignore the idea that society evolved our of extended families and tribes. It also tends to ignore any idea of a natural tendency to associate or desire companionship. Basically, for Plato, states emerge because people are best at doing one thing so, in the face of specialization, states can grow in complexity of filling needs only by acquiring more diverse people. Eventually, as complexity increases, states need internal organization and direction; they also clearly need an adequate defense against changing political environments. The people who will provide organization, direction, and defense will be called guardians. From here onward, Plato devotes himself to the guardians.
Plato lays out an elaborate plan for the education of the guardians. It will expose them to the best influences in literature, music, and physical preparation. Needless to say, much of what is presently available will not be usable. Literature and music, for instance, must provide the best educational stimuli; they cannot merely reflect the inventive accidents of their artists. A contemporary audience is shocked by the degree to which Plato would control the educational resources to which the guardians are exposed. One should ask, however, whether one can really defend the results of our own laissez faire attitudes. For Plato, what is involved is the most important aspect of life, namely, the best start toward a life of acquiring wisdom.
Once the education of the guardians is described, Plato describes how the guardians will be tested and divided into the ruling guardians (those who are wisest and can rule) and the auxiliary guardians (those who will be used for organization and defense). It is clear that Plato's society has three rigidly defined classes and even Plato recognizes that this will not obviously be approved by normal people. It is essential, in the founding of the state, to make a "noble lie" which people grow up with and makes stratification into classes natural to them. This is the "Myth of Metals." The people will grow up believing that there are three different inner natures that the rulers of the state can discover within the education process. Thus, through education, the children will be separated and start their paths to realize their particular inner natures. It is important to recognize that the chief aspect of inner nature that Plato has in mind is access to wisdom. The stronger the inner nature, the less important are external things (wealth, activity, etc.). The weaker the inner nature, the more important are external things (working through crafts, agriculture, fishing, etc.). Lies will be balanced between internal and external realms as appropriate.
How then will the guardians live? There are two determining factors. First, given what has been said above, their external world will be very sparse. Second, they must avoid other possible means of corruption. They must remain focused on the good of society. The ideal mode of living, then, is a commune in which they are constantly within a social focus. They are all brothers and sisters. Property and privileges are unknown.
With the ideal state fully described, Plato is prepared to consider its virtues. The Greek conception of virtue suggests that the state should be wise, courageous, temperate, and just. To find justice, Plato proceeds through the virtues in this order. The state is wise, of course, because it is ruled by the wisest among the people. The state is courageous because its defense is in the hands of the wise and caring auxiliaries. But what are temperance and justice in the state? Temperance is the state's ability to overcome diverse or disparate aims or motives and, hence, to continue on a constructive path of development. The state's temperance derives from the fact that the classes work together effectively. Justice, finally, lies in the fact that each class does the work for which it is intended and qualified, submitting itself to the authority of ordering principles.
At this point, Plato must employ the analogy between individual and state in order to discover the virtues of the individual as "read" from the virtues of the state. Before he can do this, he must demonstrate that the analogy holds in detail. Thus, since the state possesses three classes, Plato must argue that we can reasonably find three divisions in individuals, indeed, in the souls of individuals. Since we have no capacity to see into the souls of men, the argument must be made by inference; and the principle of inference that Plato employs is that tensions, indecisiveness, and inconsistent behaviors in individuals demonstrate division of opposing factors within the soul. Plato develops examples of several situations that lead him to conclude that each soul can be divided into a desiring faction, a reasoning faction, and a spirited faction. It is no surprise that these closely parallel the classes of his ideal state. It is more surprising, perhaps, that this three-part division has survived 2400 years in various philosophical and psychological treatises. It is very close, indeed, to Freud's analysis of the human psyche (for which Freud used the German word 'Seele' also translatable as "soul") into the Id ('das Es' in German or "the It"), the Ego ('das Ich' in German or literally "the I"), and the Superego ('das Ueber-Ich' in German or "the Over-I" also called "Conscience" or ruling reason). Nietzsche had suggested a similar division 50 years earlier.
The individual interpretation of the virtues is now clear. Obviously, courage comes from the so-called spirited faction; and wisdom comes from the reasoning faction. Temperance, evidently, means that the complex of three factions is balanced and properly organized so as to lead the individual on a constructive path. Justice means that each faction of the individual performs its intended duty to the organism and no faction tries to usurp another's role. For instance, an individual would become less just if the desiring part were to begin to take over a portion of the reasoning faculty.
At this point, since Plato has now defined justice, one should look back at the definitions offered in the introductory section of The Republic. In particular, it is interesting to look at the definition given by Cephalos and his son, Polemarchus. Cephalos suggested that the just man has lived in harmony with human society. Polemarchos suggested following the poetic wisdom that we "give back what is owed to each." Plato's suggestion is not that far removed, but he has given both an explicit context.
By the end of Book IV, Plato had completed his description of the ideal state, an aristocracy of wisdom, and he had used that description to interpret the concepts of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. Also, he completed his analogy between individual and state so that he could extend his interpretation to the virtues of the individual. Indeed, in Plato's mind, the state and the individual share the same virtues and also the same possibilities of decline from virtue.
At the beginning of Book V, Plato is beginning to organize himself to describe the manifold ways in which both the state and the individual can decline and become corrupted. However, he is interrupted and these descriptions are, then, left until Books VIII and IX. Books V, VI, and VII offer answers to the questions that the audience now pose. Plato is reticent to answer these because he knows the answers will be unpopular and difficult to believe since they certainly contradict Athenian traditions. Plato conceives of these as three great waves of increasing difficulty --- the role of women, the structure and disposition of families, and the authority to rule.
Beginning at 451c, Plato takes up the role of women in his ideal state. The thesis that Plato will pursue is that men and women should be treated as equals and play all of the same roles as qualified by their individual natures. But won't it be argued that men and women have radically different natures such that men will have their own roles and women, entirely separate ones?
Well, Plato sees only two genuine differences between men and women. Women are equipped by nature to bear children and women, in his opinion, are generally weaker physically. When it comes to various tasks, we see that men and women can both try to do various things, though men are often better in some and women better in others. But this both demonstrates that men and women can do the same things and that more common education could erode the observed differences in performance. In effect, Plato argues that, in a good state, we should strive to prepare everyone to develop their best potential, male or female, and that the state will be best served by creating, in this way, the largest population of excellence. We should focus attention on inner natures and potential and not on superficial differences.
This ends the first argument but Plato imagines that the second argument will be an even greater challenge. At 457d, he introduces the second thesis, that the Guardians will live as one "family" --- communally --- husbands, wives, and children all in common. [NOTE: Plato never deals with the question of whether this pattern of family life should also apply to the less educated merchants, craftsmen, and farmers. One suspects, however, that his answer would be negative. The difference between metals prevails. The highest have a strong inner life, while the lowest must have strong outer lives. That which can be foregone in the outer life by the Guardians must still be realized in the outer lives of the lower people.] Plato proceeds by dividing the issue, first, by exploring the plan and its benefits to the state and, second, by arguing for its possibility.
The proposal is indeed amazing. Plato would have all Guardians (and Auxiliaries) live together communally with different generations calling each other brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers, etc. Furthermore, he would carry his general idea of "best natures" to the obvious conclusion that only the best should mate with the best and bring forth the best of children. Since this will obviously defy natural feelings, the rulers of the state will have to organize the matrimonial process carefully, making matrimony very sacred and providing for selection on some apparently competitive basis so that the losers will blame their bad luck rather than the decisions of the rulers. Plato clearly believes that it will be best to practice abortion or exposure to maintain the quality of children. Now, having described the plan, he faces the challenge of demonstrating its benefits (462a). Plato's argument is distinctly a matter of public versus private life. When we are allowed private property and interests, the natural tendency is to try to gain whatever we can, even when it is not naturally ours. This leads to discord and disagreement. The great benefit to the state, in Plato's system of Guardian families, is the holding of all property in common so that the greatest accord between rulers is promoted. In Plato's vision, the Guardians take joy in the same things and feel sorrow in the same situations. They are together in promoting the good of the state. They struggle to protect what is collectively theirs.
After some further elaboration of how the Guardian class will conduct its communal life, including how they will conduct themselves among all Hellenic peoples, Plato is challenged to demonstrate that this is all possible. This, in fact, is the third great wave, or argument, that he has anticipated. At 473d, he introduces his final thesis, that philosophers should be the kings of the ideal state! From here to the end of Book VII, Plato discusses the role of philosophy.
The philosopher is a lover of wisdom; and like all lovers of any kind, the philosopher loves the whole of wisdom. But how do we separate those who merely dabble in everything from the true philosophers? Plato observes that the true philosophers are "lovers of the vision of truth." This requires some explanation. What Plato has in mind is a person who recognizes the universal (or absolute) in any sphere and distinguishes it from the particulars that simply participate in it. The philosopher sees and loves absolute beauty through his experience of beautiful things.
From here to the end of Book V, Plato develops the differences between ignorance, opinion, and knowledge. In his view, these are related to non-being, becoming, and being, respectively. To know something is to possess a kind of certainty and permanence regarding it. But what would be the proper objects of knowledge in this sense? Only being, as such, namely, that which truly is, could be the proper object of knowledge. While this may seem obvious, the difficult issue for Plato is to convince us that opinion is intermediate between knowledge and ignorance, whose proper object is non-being. Thus, the proper objects of opinion must lie intermediate between non-being and being. So the proper objects of opinion lie in the realm of becoming and that is precisely where we live. We can only have opinions about the things of our world; and we can see this within the fact that everything we address in this world is in flux and of degrees. A philosopher, then, is a lover of wisdom, that is, a lover of knowledge of being, of that which truly is. Those who remain lovers of the things in becoming's realm remain lovers of opinion only and have no sight of truth.
Having pointed out that philosophers are true lovers of wisdom and that not all who call themselves philosophers qualify, Plato stands in the position of needing to clarify what wisdom is and what the problems are with addressing wisdom. That is, why is the goal of philosophy so difficult and, hence, why is it so rarely realized? Yet, if a philosopher were king, why would this so obviously promote a truly virtuous state? This discussion continues throughout Book VI.
In the end, the problem really revolves around the fact that knowledge (and wisdom) is not what we would first expect or that the multitude would judge it. Knowledge is not present in experience, as such; but it can only be recollected, in very abstract ways, through the midwifery of experience. Knowledge addresses that which is, that is, those objects that are found in the realm of being. These are the proper objects of knowledge because they only are permanent and unchanging. All experience, on the other hand, is in the realm of becoming; these objects are always in a state of flux. Thus, it is only by a well ordered, disciplined, and faithfully carried out program of educational experience that the individual can address the objects of knowledge. Indeed, our only access to knowledge lies in the facts of reincarnation and of the individual soul's relationship to the realm of being.
Plato considers the realm of becoming as a world in which we sustain sense impressions of objects, especially through sight, and in which the sun plays the crucial role of illuminating objects for us to see. In the realm of being, another entity provides analogous "illumination" of these objects so that the minds of our souls can apprehend them. This entity is the Idea of the Good. Plato pursues the analogy consistently; for instance, there is no way that we can "look directly" into the Idea of the Good than we could see directly into the sun. Yet it is the Good which illumines all of the Ideas, or objects of being.
There is a crucial concept that potentially connects the two realms, making it possible for us to use the medium of experience to recollect our knowledge of the Ideas. That is the concept of "participation." Thus, Plato frequently says that something participates in its ideal; e.g., a particular chair participates in the essence of being a chair. An elaboration of the concept of participation was a problem that Plato never really solved and that Aristotle carried forward into his own approach to metaphysics and epistemology.
In Book VII, Plato expands on his metaphysical and epistemological ideas by telling the Allegory of the Cave. In this story, the interior of the cave is likened to the realm of becoming and the exterior, daylight landscape is likened to the realm of being, illuminated by the Idea of the Good. All are in chains in the cave except one who somehow breaks the chains and begins the long journey upward to the exterior world. Once one has seen what the world is really like, why would one want to go back to the cave? But also, if one did go back and tell the others about the real world, wouldn't he/she be laughed at and, probably, punished or imprisoned? Thus, if a philosopher is to rule, he will have to do it out of obligation and certainly won't do it out of desire.
In the remainder of this book, Plato discusses the educational process which, in real life, will replace this metaphorical unchaining. A crucial idea is the starting point. While Plato believes that all education should begin in the perfection of the body with gymnastic, he sees arithmetic, number in particular, as the starting point of the long journey toward recollection of knowledge. What is it about arithmetic? Plato believes that we discover a fundamental puzzle in arithmetic; it is the puzzle of "the one and the many." We have already noticed the one and the many in sense experience, perhaps. For we can see that a single object can be divided up into many attributes. At the same time, we can see many trees, of some distinct kind, which, nevertheless, represent one tree. Arithmetic, in Plato's mind, gives us an abstract theater in which to explore this concept and, importantly, to make the jump from the work of the senses to the work of the mind.
The book concludes as Plato gives some estimate to the ages at which we can expect different kinds of knowledge to be achieved. It is a sobering schedule, in the face of our own concepts of education, since Plato does not imagine that we will have made great progress toward dialectical knowledge until we are well advanced in years.
Books V, VI, and VII have been a long sidetrack in the discussion of states and individuals. In Book VIII, Plato returns to the point where he was at the beginning of Book V. He had developed a full concept of the virtuous state as an aristocracy of wisdom; and he had related this, by analogy, to the virtuous individual who is also ruled by wisdom. His concern is that virtue is so infrequently in evidence in the practical world of states and individuals. What goes wrong?
Plato decides to discuss five kinds of states and individuals and, again, decides to work first with states because it should be easier to see the changes involved in the macrocosm of states. The five kinds of states, in order of decline, are aristocracy of wisdom, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. Since we already know what aristocracy is, the question is what factors lead to the decline of aristocracy into timocracy. Note, while Plato will simply speak of "aristocracy," it is essential to keep in mind the fact that aristocracies can be based on different characteristics and that Plato's aristocracy is based on wisdom rather than on, say, birthright or heredity.
The transition from aristocracy to timocracy comes from a subtle shift in the guardian class itself. Plato grants that his system of child rearing and education is complex so he sees this as the weakest point. Children will be born at the wrong times and the guardians will lose track of the right ways to recognize their talents. As a result, the guardian class will gradually lose its mental acuteness. Matters will be decided by rhetorical boldness rather than by careful dialectic. While other portions of society will continue to function properly, the direction of rule itself will be guided more and more by matters of spirit and honor. The guardians themselves will be increasingly in conflict with each other. Worse yet, as wisdom declines, the guardians will begin to value wealth over knowledge (hence, goodness) and will begin harboring away wealth for themselves. In the end, the rulers have become highly competitive rather than cooperating with each other through the pursuit of wisdom. [Note the strong influence of the Pythagoreans in the way Plato sees numerical errors entering into the marriage and birth processes.] Plato also outlines a similar decline in the individual.
The next stage of political decline is oligarchy by which Plato means "the rule of wealth." In timocracy, above, the system is still a rule of wisdom in the sense that the guardian class, which has been selected for its wisdom, remains in power even though its own grasp of wisdom has become substantially compromised. Oligarchy represents a complete breakdown in the class of rulers so that rulers are now selected on the basis of wealth rather than of wisdom. The transition is easy enough to see happening. The guardians themselves gradually lose sight of wisdom and, hence, goodness and, instead, value wealth and competition to attain wealth. All that remains is the formalization of wealth-getting as the highest social value and, hence, the obvious criterion for political power. The fundamental error in this, from Plato's perspective, is the confusion of talents. He likens it to appointing a man as ship's captain because he is a successful businessman, knowing nothing about guiding ships. But there is another aspect of oligarchy which is also troubling. Society has now become completely divided between the rich and the poor. It can no longer function in unity. The poor must be disarmed out of fear and criminal elements arise. The rich retain their wealth and power by keeping the majority of people poor and powerless.
Ultimately, what can come of an oligarchic state? Plato's answer is not far removed from the predictions of Karl Marx more than 2000 years later. As the impoverished people become more united in their poverty, they have little to lose and are increasingly inclined toward revolution. Ironically, powerlessness becomes empowering. Marx called it the "revolution of the proletariat." But when the people take command of society, there is no residue of aristocracy left. The oligarchs have trained the people to accept wealth and wealth-getting as the only value, and the people at large have shown that wealth can be taken, as much as earned. Revolution has taught them that anyone can take wealth and acquire power. There is no longer any talent or occupation involved. Even the criteria of rule for oligarchs has been passed by; there is no longer any criterion for rule. Marx, of course, was considerably more optimistic than Plato about the democractic communism that would result.
We should pause, at this point, to take note of how far things have declined. The virtue of the state is to provide a context in which citizens of the state can become good and lead good lives. How could a democracy do this? A democracy recognizes only individual freedom to do as one pleases and fails to lead anyone toward an understanding of the good. Meanwhile, the state itself is wandering aimlessly in all directions since the only criterion recognized for rule is the individual's desire to lead. This, Plato would allege, was precisely what destroyed the Athenian democracy. Not only was Athens failing to educate its citizens properly but the state itself wandered into an intractable war with Sparta, which it ultimately lost.
All that remains is the ultimate decline into tyranny. This is a relatively simple transition from the tyranny of all to the tyranny of one, and it foreshadows the classic emergence of fascist states out of democractic republics in the 20th Century. The origin of democracy's problems rests in the extreme value that democracy places on freedom; indeed, for the moment at least, freedom has replaced wealth as the primary value. In the world of individual freedom, all structural order is eventually lost; and, since Plato views the state as an organism, it should be clear that order is essential to the health of the state. This can be seen even in the breakdown of families, where the children no longer respect their parents but want full and equal rights from the time they can first conceive of these benefits. Plato almost marvels at the state of fully developed democracy because it has become a truly rich and diverse theater of human traits. Everything is there. [Note: The freedom of which Plato speaks here is an extreme autonomy of individuals and not the freedom-under-laws concept that Locke will describe later. It should be clear that both concepts play roles in today's political realm.]
The question is how long such a theater of humanity can last before the people's passions are swept off in some adventure to take power. Plato sees this happening most probably out of jealousies regarding wealth. It seems inevitable, in a society like this, that people who are talented at securing wealth and power (formerly the oligarchs) will emerge as organizers of the state and the same old jealousies will flame hatred. Now, however, the path is easier than a revolution since the people hold the political power. All they need is an heroic leader who can stir their passions and appear to solve their complaints. The people will not even notice how far this leader carries the state away from democratic principles so long as he satisfies their passions. Indeed, he can do all of this in the name of freedom! As most fascist dictators did. It will be a long time before the people will realize that they have actually become slaves and that their hero is a tyrant.
Ultimately, the question of interest to Plato and the ongoing discussion in the Republic is how to secure the happiest state and, hence, the happiness of individuals. [The issue of happiness has been present since Book I where the claim was made that happiness lies in wealth and power and far from the moral life.] Plato concludes this section of the argument by asserting that happiness declines in the ways of the states and the individuals involved. Thus, the aristocracy of wisdom is likely to be the best designed state in helping its citizens to become happy, healthy individuals. Human happiness, according to Plato, does not lie in freedom, power, or wealth as such, but rather in developing one's potential as fully as possible within the niche of one's talents and in harmony with a state that is organized on the principle of appreciating and utilizing those talents.
Updated on November 17, 2005; click here to return to My HomePage or here to return to Course Index Page.