"Supposing truth is a woman --- what then?" Nietzsche writes at the beginning [Preface] of this work. "What is certain is that she has not allowed herself to be won --- and today every kind of dogmatism is left standing dispirited and discouraged." This book is written for "philosophers of the future," "free spirits," brave individuals who are not shy of destroying much in order to find a clear field for sowing new values. Only these can ultimately find themselves beyond the dichotomy of good and evil; but there are great risks.
This is a book about ethics but "ethics" in the classic sense, that is, the fundamental issue of living, how to live well, the setting of values for one's self. Morality, while it pretends to structure living correctly, always does this from the point of view of society and enforces conformity. In this sense, morality is always nihilistic from the start in that it always begins from the position of alienating life from the individual will, making good life seem to come from external sources. Just as European society has made belief in god impossible, it has more fundamentally made belief in one's self impossible. The true sources of value have been thwarted and value is dictated by the crowd. In Zarathustra, Nietzsche had written, "a tablet of the good hangs over every people. Behold, it is the tablet of their overcomings; behold, it is the voice of their will to power."
The book is also transitional in Nietzsche's work. Both The Gay Science and Zarathustra reveal Nietzsche coming to terms with his own inner struggles and climbing out of personal nihilism to find himself in an exuberant YES-saying to life. In this book, Nietzsche turns to the problem of modern man himself, to inviting colleagues, fellow free spirits. But much of this work must be NO-saying, that is, much of it must be destructive and critical, tearing down a society that we naively praise, a society that is thoroughly nihilistic. (Nietzsche's first use of the term 'nihilism' is at BGE, #10.) Nietzsche finished the last part of Zarathustra in January of 1884 but this was not published because it was deemed too blasphemous. Beyond Good and Evil was published in September of 1886; Nietzsche wrote Burkhardt begging him to read the book and suggesting that "it says the same things as my Zarathustra, but differently, very differently.". Nietzsche published it at his own expense and afforded printing of only 300 copies. Approximately a year later, it had sold 114 copies and he'd given away another 66. (Kaufmann's "Translator's Preface")
The "logical" basis of Nietzsche's analysis is shared by all three works. It is what Nietzsche himself calls "physico-psychological," though a better expression might be "naturalistic psychology." It is informed by Lamarkian and Darwinian biology as well as by his own original meditations on psychology, beginning in Human, All-too-Human and Daybreak. But Nietzsche was also very fond of the American essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson and many of his psychological insights can be seen in Emerson's thought. The biological component is a strong claim that we can never forget our animal origins; much of the animal still lives on in us. Indeed, we cannot even escape our own parents --- a poignant declaration for Nietzsche! And then there is the psychological task before us, the task of self discovery that requires constant, honest, and dangerous uncovering of mask-after-mask.
Finally, the book is dangerous, perhaps one of the most dangerous books Nietzsche wrote. It is dangerous to solve our inner mysteries, for who knows where they will lead us and what we will have to remove from our paths. We know little about ourselves, really, until we open the windows and doors that confine us; where we go from there will be an adventure and involve great risks; but that is life after all. In #12 he writes, "when the new psychologist [can't we read "Freud" here?] puts an end to the superstitions which have so far flourished with almost tropical luxuriance around the idea of the soul, he practically exiles himself into a new desert and a new suspicion." And, at #23, "a proper physio-psychologist has to contend with unconscious resistance in the heart of the investigator." (My emphasis)
In Nietzsche's typical style of writing, he wanders widely around his path and uses bold metaphors. It would be easy enough, at times, to conclude that he is preaching violence and warfare. But we have to keep our reading balanced and take Nietzsche's hints about perspective. One of the most powerful indicators, in this regard, is aphorism #287. "It is not actions that prove him --- actions are always open to interpretations, always unfathomable --- nor is it "works." . . it is the faith that is decisive here, that determines the order of rank . . . The noble soul has reverence for itself."
The first three chapters spell out the situation in detail --- what is wrong with the "philosophers" of the present, what we should seek in the "free spirits" of the future, and how all of this is conditioned by our unfortunate history in Christianity. We have been possessed by the will to truth, but has anyone ever [before Nietzsche himself] thought to ask why. What is the value of truth? In The Gay Science #110 (1882) Nietzsche first faced these hard questions and developed a "naturalistic" conception of human language evolving usefully over a long period, tested only by its survival potential. But truth, what will it be tested by? Nietzsche suggested here that truth remains an "experiment;" it has not yet been demonstrated useful by our natural history. Perhaps, indeed, truth isn't the point so our possession by the problem of truth is a distraction and a weakness. In #34 he writes, "It is no more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than mere appearance; it is even the worst proved assumption there is in the world."
From Plato [and probably earlier] onward, philosophy has been possessed by a string of other-worldly realities which pose to us the problem of [their] truth. In so far as this is a problem, it defines those who possess power by holding the answers; in so far as this is a vision of reality, it defines the right to command. But why do we believe in other-worldly realities? Nietzsche believes in chaos and "perspective" --- that is, each person's individual world-concept, which is bravely crafted and necessarily dangerous (because only experience/evolution tests our assumptions). At #36 he writes, "Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our world of desires and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other "reality" besides the reality of our drives --- for thinking is merely a relation of these drives to each other." At its best, then, life is a struggle to put together one's own perspective on "world" and to avoid the self-limiting and life-poisoning dictates of "realities" imposed by others.
We should not read this section in too limited a way. That is, Nietzsche includes what might be called "natural philosophers," or scientists, along with philosophers. In many ways, this is a return to the parallel treatment given as early as The Birth of Tragedy to Platonism and "theoretical man." The "science" praised by Nietzsche throughout The Gay Science is not "theoretical" or reality building; rather this is insightfulness and intellectual honesty and willingness to risk experimentation. Hence, everything that Nietzsche says here about philosophers can be extended to scientists. With all of them, one should be skeptical about their claims to "objectivity." In fact, one should always cautiously inquire into the variety of ways that both philosophers and scientists "discover" and rationalize their own subjective prejudices.
But if we should reject our traditions in philosophy and science, what principles of operation should we embrace in becoming "free spirits?"
Finally, Nietzsche approaches Das religiöse Wesen, the religious being. It is one of Nietzsche's first concerted efforts at taking apart this issue in a systematic way, and it is a very complex argument, to be read carefully (not that this is anything new!). The very first aphorism seems to be about psychology and not about religion. Why? In the second aphorism, Nietzsche makes specific reference to "original Christianity." Why? As the section continues, it becomes clear that Nietzsche distinguishes between religion and the religious, between original Christianity and later, institutionalized Christianity, and between Christianity and other religions. The religious being is not a problem to Nietzsche; he is not an antagonist of the religious as such. It is, in fact, an instinctive human inquiry, a matter for the "born psychologist and lover of the 'great hunt'." (#45) The historic social problem with the religious is that we fail to accept the claim at the end of this aphorism -- that, "in the end one has to do everything oneself." Hence, we look for compatriots; we send scholars off on the hunt. As an individual inquiry, the religious is authentic; Nietzsche will later make this point about Jesus. As a collective inquiry and institutionalized system, religion quickly becomes oppressive; Nietzsche ends by saying that "Christianity has been the most calamitous kind of arrogance yet."
It is clear that the psychological/religious hunt for the limits of the human soul and "the range of inner human experiences" can become a neurosis. As Nietzsche points out (#47) it most frequently seems to lead us to "solitude, fasting, and sexual abstinence." What makes the saint possible? And why does the image of the saint dominate our images of the religious? Note Nietzsche's praise of Greek religiosity (#49) where the Greeks, consistent with the tragic sensitivity, cherish the abundance of life in full view of its catastrophic realities. No sainthood there. In the saint, Nietzsche finds "the riddle of self-conquest and [the] deliberate final renunciation." (#51) Why does this demand so much attention from us? His conclusion is that "it was the 'will to power' that made them stop before the saint." The theme is clear; the Christian saint represents a kind of "ideal" case of revaluation-of-all-values, an expression of will to power, in which self and life are overcome. Our greatest expression of life is a humiliation of life itself.
On the other hand, Nietzsche suggests about his times that "the religious instinct is indeed in the process of growing powerfully -- but the theistic satisfaction [is viewed] with deep suspicion." (#53) "One always pays dearly and terribly when religions do not want to be a means of education and cultivation in the philosopher's hand but insist on having their own sovereign way, when they themselves want to be ultimate ends and not means among other means." (#62) Again, the problem is not with the religious but with religions.
In the section called "Natural History of Morals," Nietzsche illustrates his "naturalist" methodology by submitting the grounds of our moral beliefs to close inspection. Do these emerge from abstract, philosophical, or religious truths; or do they emerge in the social relations of humans as historical residues of past eras? The section anticipates the themes of Nietzsche's next major work, The Genealogy of Morals. The historical priority, according to Nietzsche, goes to the dichotomy, good and bad; but even that is scarcely a dichotomy, according to him. Nietzsche's concept of the past is that the inventive, self-confident, powerful noble men privilege their own values (choices) as "good." Everything else, by contrast, is not good, hence, "bad." But "bad" as such is merely a negation, a falling short; it is no separate, comparable feature.
Historically, what we have is a standard, an example, that stands above all else. However, in the evolution of human society, especially in the Christian era, Nietzsche sees the "herd" of common people reconstructing their own position, a position in which mediocrity can become a virtue, a "herd morality." It is within this movement that the concept of "evil" is invented so that "good and evil" becomes a true dichotomy, or balance. And the concept of "evil" is a device that intends to level the human world. In #201, Nietzsche writes, "everything that elevates an individual above the herd and intimidates the neighbor is henceforth called evil; and the fair, modest, submissive, conforming mentality, the mediocrity of desires attains moral designations and honors." He continues, "There is a point in the history of society when it becomes so pathologically soft and tender that among other things it sides even with those who harm it, criminals, and does this quite seriously and honestly." All of this is amplified further in #260. The section ends with the declaration, "we have a different faith," setting the theme for the remainder of the book. "To teach man the future of man as his will, as dependent on a human will, and to prepare great ventures" is Nietzsche's message. But we are fearful of leaving the "security" of the herd and we elevate our fears in images of leaders who make mistakes, who fail, or who degenerate. The balance point of morality lies in this trade off -- what seems secure by tradition even if it diminishes life versus what men can create out of their own will to become though that may mean risk and painful growth.
The culmination of this book is the chapter "What Is Noble?" True morality, in Nietzsche's naturalism, is nobility; this is where we will find the "free spirits," the philosophers of the future. "Every enhancement of the type "man" has so far been the work of an aristocratic society." (#257) But what is nobility and how do we reach it, given the great odds against it in this world? Throughout this book Nietzsche's metaphors tend toward extravagance and often seem almost militarist. It is easy to interpret Nietzsche as preaching power as might and suppression of the masses. In this respect, the final chapter is extremely important; for here it becomes clear that Nietzsche's metaphors relate more certainly to the strength of will that one must apply to one's self. The struggle for nobility is an inner struggle and it is, indeed, both difficult and dangerous. "The dangerous and uncanny point has been reached where the greater, more manifold, more comprehensive life transcends and lives beyond the old morality; the "individual" appears, obliged to give himself laws and to develop his own arts and wiles for self-preservation, self-enhancement, self-redemption." (#262) Note, "one must invoke tremendous counter-forces in order to cross this natural, all too natural progressus in simile, the continual development of man toward the similar, ordinary, average, herdlike --- common!" (#268) It is in this context, at #287, that he writes, "The noble soul has reverence for itself;" and he perceives, with an implicit reference to his Zarathustra, that every noble person may have to be a hermit for at least a time. "Every profound thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood. The latter may hurt his vanity, but the former his heart, his sympathy, which always says: "Alas, why do you want to have as hard a time as I did?"" (#290)
In the end, the book is dedicated to the Greek god, Dionysus, "that great ambiguous one and tempter god." Dionysus is the god of nature, especially of all natural processes --- vegetation, fertilization, procreation. Life flows out of Dionysus in all of its marvelous complexity and variety. But Dionysus is also supremely dangerous; he is also the god of intoxication, decay, and dismemberment. Life, afterall, is always just at the edge of death and destruction. For Nietzsche, Dionysus is the symbol of delight and danger, the fundamental elements of personal liberation, a richness of living that is Yes-saying and refuses to compromise life to mediocrity and conformity. Dionysus stands in stark contrast to Jesus, "the Crucified One" --- "one of the most painful cases of the martyrdom of knowledge about love: the martyrdom of the most innocent and desirous heart, never sated by any human love; demanding love, to be loved and nothing else." (#269)
copyright 1995 by Tad Beckman